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The Regulation of Stem Cell Research in Ireland: From the Commission on Assisted Human 
Reproduction to the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017 
Abstract 
In 2005 Ireland’s Commission on Assisted Reproduction (CAHR) published a comprehensive report on 
the regulation of assisted reproduction and associated technologies. Yet since that that Report, 
successive Irish governments have failed to bring forth any legislation on this matter. This legislative 
inaction has resulted in a situation whereby the embryo in vivo has the right to life under the Irish 
Constitution, but embryos in vitro have no protection in law. Irish policy makers have also endorsed 
and funded embryonic stem cell research (ESCR) at a European level, but continues to prevent 
researchers in Ireland from accessing any public funds for this research. The publication in October 
2017 of the General Scheme of the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017 is thus a welcomed 
development. However further reading of the Bill reveals that it is restrictive in nature and likely to 
stifle research in Ireland. This paper will discuss the legal, ethical and scientific developments that have 
occurred since the CAHR report and the impact, if any, they have had on the development of this Bill. 
It will critically reflect on provisions of the Bill as they relate to ESCR and make a number of suggestions 
for reform.  
Introduction 
Since the announcement of the creation of the first embryonic stem cell line almost 20 years ago,1 
attention has focused on the ethical and legal status of the research. Found in an early-phase embryo, 
an embryonic stem cell has the potential to develop into any cell type in the body and can potentially 
be engineered to produce new tissues or organs, bringing new hope to those suffering from 
degenerative illness as well as other incurable diseases. However embryonic stem cell research (ESCR) 
has faced much resistance to embryonic stem cell research as the debate on the moral status of the 
embryo continues. Disagreement persists as to whether the embryo is considered to be life, a clump 
of cells or having some other intermediate status. 2 Throughout the world, jurisdictions have 
considered the legal, ethical and social implications of the research that has resulted in regulations on 
this matter.3 Yet Ireland remains one of the few countries in Europe without any legislative scheme or 
national oversight of this research. This has resulted in a peculiar situation whereby the embryo in 
vivo has full constitutional protection through Article 40.3.3, but since the Supreme Court in Roche v 
                                                          
1 J Thomson, J Itskovitz-Eldor, S Shapiro, M Waknitz, J Swiergiel, V Marshall, J Jones,  ‘Embryonic Stem Cell 
Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts’ (1998) 282 Science 1145-7. 
2 See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain Biological Questions 
(2008). 2 D Evans (ed), Conceiving the Embryo: Ethics, Law and Practice in Human Embryology (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1996). P Singer, K Dawson, ‘IVF technology and the argument from potential’ (1988) 17 Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 87. C Cohen, Renewing the Stuff of Lie: Stem Cells, Ethics, and Public Policy (OUP 2007). M 
Lockwood, ‘When Does Life Begin?’ in M Lockwood (ed), Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine (OUP 1985). N 
Poplawski, G Gillett, ‘Ethics and Embryos” (1991) 17 Journal of Medical Ethics 62 
3 R Isasi, B Knoppers ‘Mind the Gap: Policy approaches to Embryonic Stem Cell and Cloning in 50 Countries’ 
(2006) 13 European Journal of Health Law 9-25. 
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Roche4 clarified that the embryo in vitro is not protected under this Article, it has had no protection in 
law.  
The Commission on Assisted Reproductive Human Reproduction (CAHR) published a comprehensive 
government commissioned report in 2005, but successive governments failed to bring forth any 
legislation until October 2017 when a General Scheme of Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017 was 
introduced. In the intervening 12 years since the publication of the CAHR and the General Scheme of 
this Bill, there has been considerable scientific developments in the realm of ESCR and embryo 
research, constitutional developments on the status of the embryo in Irish law, and developments on 
the funding and patenting of ESCR at a European level.  
On the face of it, this Bill is a welcomed development as an attempt to clarify the status of ESCR in 
Ireland. It should remedy the anomalous situation that sees Ireland funding ESCR at a European level, 
but preventing scientists from accessing European funds. It also should serve as a much needed 
opportunity to have a national debate on these issues in light of the intervening twelve years since 
the CAHR report. However, while the Bill does permit ESCR, a closer reading of it reveals that it is 
restrictive in nature and likely to stifle research. It also fails to adequately consider the legal, ethical 
and scientific developments that has taken place since the publication of this Bill. To remedy this, this 
paper will consider the legal and ethical developments that have since taken place. It will discuss 
induced pluripotent cell (IPSC) research and whether this erodes the need for ESCR. It will consider 
the legal status of the embryo arising from the Roche v Roche case and whether a European consensus 
has begun to emerge on the status of the embryo. Finally it will reflect on the impact that these 
developments have had on the General Scheme of the Bill. 
Ethical considerations & IPSCs 
Found in an early-phase embryo, an embryonic stem cell has the potential to develop into any cell 
type in the body and can potentially be engineered to produce new tissues or organs, bringing hope 
to those suffering from degenerative illness as well as other incurable diseases.5 As well as potential 
therapeutic benefit, stem cells may help us better understand the developmental process of the 
embryo and the causes of certain defects. The chief concern with ESCR is that it involves the 
destruction of the embryo. Herein lies what Devolder calls ‘The Problem’: 
‘Either one supports embryonic stem cell research and accepts resulting embryo destruction, 
or one opposes embryonic stem cell research and accepts that the potential benefits of the 
research will be forgotten.’6 
Presented as such, we seem to have a choice between destroying an embryo for its potential medical 
benefits and protecting the embryo at all costs.  For many the answer is less clear due to the uncertain 
status of the embryo; they may want the benefit of ESCR but may feel unease with embryo destruction. 
                                                          
4 Roche v Roche [2010] 2IR 321. 
5  For more on the potential of the research see Editorial, ‘The Promise of Stem Cells’ (2004) 7 Nature 
Neuroscience 1013. 
6 K Devolder The Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Oxford University Press, 2015), 2. 
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Although the moral status of the embryo has been discussed in detail elsewhere,7 some of the main 
discussion points are worth noting here. 
The embryo may have the same moral status as that of a human being and irrespective of its 
instrumental value it can never be destroyed.8 The practical implications of this are that all embryos 
fertilised in vitro must be implanted and certain contraceptive practices such as the morning after pill 
that are currently widely utilised in Ireland must be prohibited.  
Others see the development of the early embryo into the foetus and gradually into the birth of a child, 
as part of a process upon which an embryo gradually acquires status as it develops. Known as the 
gradualist approach, this was the position adopted by the Irish Council on Bioethics, which felt that 
the embryo had significant but not full moral status and justified their position on the ‘potentiality 
argument’;9 it is because of their potential to develop into a human being that embryos have some 
moral status and there must therefore be limits on the use of embryos for research purposes.  
Lockwood argues that debates on the moral status of the embryo rarely achieve much as they are 
usually inconclusive.10 This is perhaps valid and may explain why differences in regulatory approaches 
have emerged. Approaches to the regulation of ESCR have ranged from relatively liberal policies in the 
UK, quite restrictive policies such as in Germany that only permit ESCR on imported embryonic stem 
cell lines, to what could be perceived to be intermediate policies as demonstrated in France that 
permit ESCR on embryonic stem cell lines created from left over embryos. Rarely are policies 
entrenched in a particular viewpoint of the embryo, but rather they reflect a political 
compromise.11Since the publication of the CAHR report, scientists have developed and begun to 
understand the potential of IPSCs. IPSCs are reprogrammed adult stem cells that are pluripotent and 
have many similar characteristics to human embryonic stem cells (hESCs).12 These cells do not involve 
the destruction of an embryo and as such, do not attract the same ethical controversy.13 Thus if we 
support the aims of ESCR, but have unease with the destruction of the embryo in the process, IPSCs 
could possibly provide an ethically acceptable alternative. 
A considerable amount of effort has gone into exploring this possible avenue of research,14 however, 
if we still want to achieve the goals of ESCR, focusing on IPSCs alone will not achieve this. There are a 
                                                          
7 Irish Council on Bioethics Ethical, Scientific and Legal Issues Concerning Stem Cell Research (2008). 
Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction Report of the Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction 
(2005). F Gough, ‘Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Ireland: Ethical and Legal Issues’ (2011) 11 (4) 
Medical Law International 262-283. 
8 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain Biological Questions 
(2008). 
9 Irish Council on Bioethics Ethical, Scientific and Legal Issues Concerning Stem Cell Research (2008), 41. 
10 M Lockwood n4, 9-10. 
11 D Smith, ‘Stuck in the Middle’ (2006) 36 The Hastings Centre Report 32. R Charo, ‘Bush’s Stem Cell 
Compromise: A Few Mirrors?’ (2001) 34 The Hastings Center Report 6 
12 K Takahshi, S Yamanaka, ‘Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Mouse Embryonic and Adult Fibroblast 
Cultures by Defined Factors’ (2006) 131 Cell 861. K Takahashi et al ‘Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from 
Adult Human Fibroblasts by Defined Factors’ (2007) 131 Cell 861.J Yee, ‘Turning Somatic Cells into Pluripotent 
Stem Cells’ (2010) 3(9) Nature Education 25, 25. 
13 M Roa, M Condic, ‘Alternative Sources of Pluripotent Stem Cells’ (2008) 17 Cells’ Stem Cells and 
Development 4. 
14 J Hanley, G Rastegarlari,  A Nathwani, An introduction to induced pluripotent stem cells (2010) British 
Journal of Haematology, 151, 16–24, 17. 
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number of differences between hESCs and IPSCs and the impact that these differences may have on 
the function of the cells and safety is currently unclear.15  These distinctions include genetic and 
epigenetic differences and the fact that the behaviour of each type of cell is more complex than 
previously thought.16 Further, research on both types of cells is necessary to both understand and 
harness the potential of IPSCs and it is now considered that, rather than replace hESCs, IPSCs should 
complement them.17 ESCR also began almost a decade earlier than research on IPSCs and is thus more 
advanced. For now, hESCs remain the ‘gold standard’ to which IPSCs will be compared18 and realising 
the potential of IPSCs requires ongoing ESCR. Rather than reducing the need for hESCs, Devolder 
suggests that IPSCs indirectly encourages ESCR, as hESCs will continue to be used as the control 
group.19 However IPSC research in and of itself does not face the same ethical considerations as ESCR 
and it is for that reason the International Society for Stem Cell Research has stated that it does not 
require specialised review and it is also currently permitted in Ireland.20 
Legal status of the embryo in Ireland 
Since 1983 the ‘unborn’ have been constitutionally protected with the insertion of the 8th amendment: 
‘The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the right to 
life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to 
defend and vindicate that right.’ 
The purpose of Article 40.3.3 was to constitutionally prohibit abortion, but with the ‘unborn’ 
remaining undefined in Irish law, there had been much uncertainty as to whether the amendment 
went beyond abortion and protected the embryo in vitro. This lack of discussion as to the definition 
of the unborn and its impact, if any, on the embryo is one of the many shortcomings of the formulation 
and debate around the 8th amendment. The birth of the first child through IVF had occurred five years 
previously, and arguably Parliament ought to have considered the wording of the amendment in light 
of this development. A proposed amendment in the Seanad to explicitly state that constitutional 
protection applies after implantation would have clarified the constitutional protection (vis a vis the 
embryo in vitro) but this was rejected.21  
Within a decade, the amendment became the subject of cases litigated in the High Court, Supreme 
Court and ultimately to the European Court of Human Rights,22 but its possible impact on embryos in 
vitro was largely ignored until the formation of the Constitution Review Group in Ireland in 1995. The 
Group called for a definition to clarify, amongst other things, the impact of the amendment on assisted 
                                                          
15 EuroStemCell Report Stem Cell Research: Trends and Perspectives on the Evolving International Landscape 
(2013), 16 quoting an interview with Yamanaka. 
16 D Robinton, G Daley ‘The Promise of Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells in Research and Therapy’ (2012) 481 
Nature 295–305, 300. 
17 Ibid. 
18 J Aninka Mansnerus Bioethical and legal perspectives on cell reprogramming technologies Medical Law 
International 2016, Vol. 16(3-4) 206–228, 214. C Ho Juridification in Bioethics: Governance of Human 
Pluripotent Cell Research (World Scientific, 2016), 69. 
19 K Devolder n 7, 129. 
20 International Association for Stem Cell Research, Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and Clinical Translation 
(2016), para 2.1. 
21 Seanad Debates 1983, vol 100, col 1092. 
22 For example see AG v X [1992] 1 IR 1 53-54. A, B and C v Ireland [2010] EHRR 2032. 
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reproductive technologies and by implication, ESCR.23 Aware of the growing need to regulate assisted 
reproductive technologies, the government appointed the Commission on Assisted Human 
Reproduction in 2000.24 Its 2005 report and a subsequent report by the Irish Council for Bioethics in 
2008 considered the legal status of the embryo.25 Both reports  expressed the view that although the 
matter would need clarification from the Supreme Court, the embryo in vitro is not protected under 
Article 40.3.3.  
Clarification came in Roche v Roche when the High Court and Supreme Court were asked to consider 
whether the protection under Article 40.3.3 extended to embryos in vitro.26 The case concerned a 
couple who underwent IVF treatment but subsequently separated. There were a number of frozen 
embryos left over which Mrs Roche wanted to implant, contrary to the wishes of Mr Roche. The Court 
had to determine, amongst other issues, whether the embryo in vitro came under the definition of 
the ‘unborn’ and if so, whether it was constitutionally protected. Both courts held that it is only upon 
implantation that an embryo is constitutionally protected. The courts were very clear that this case 
was not concerned with the moral status of the embryo or determining when life begins27 as there is 
‘no definite scientific or medical answer to that question’.28  In essence, the courts felt that the 
constitutional and moral questions were distinct and their focus was on the interpretation of the 8th 
amendment. 
In considering the definition of the unborn, the courts noted that although the 8th amendment was 
inserted to constitutionally prohibit abortion, the text itself does not mention abortion but rather 
confers on the unborn a positive right to life and arguably this text goes further than simply 
constitutionally prohibiting abortion. Binchy is unequivocal that the purpose of the amendment was 
wider and focused on protecting life in the early stages that includes the embryo in vitro.29 Murray CJ, 
in determining that the issue was not justiciable, considered that if the intention was to limit the 
confines of the amendment to abortion, the Constitution would have contained an express prohibition, 
much like it did when the Constitution contained an express prohibition on divorce. Rather, the focus 
of the amendment was to afford a positive protection on all forms of early human life.30 
In examining the historical purpose of the amendment and subsequent judgments, the majority of the 
Supreme Court noted that the courts had consistently endorsed the purpose of the 8th amendment as 
being to constitutionally prohibit abortion. 31  This was, however, the first case that required a 
consideration of the meaning of ‘unborn’ beyond the confines of a termination of pregnancy. Much 
weight was given to the phrase ‘right to life of the mother’ and the link between the unborn and the 
mother. This created a constitutional relationship between the mother and the unborn and it was only 
                                                          
23 Constitution Review Group, Report of the Constitution Review Group (1996)  275. The first embryonic stem 
cell line was not derived until 1998 and thus did not form part of the analysis of the Review Group. 
24 Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction Report of the Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction 
(2005) . 
25 Irish Council for Bioethics Ethical, Legal and Scientific Issues Concerning Stem Cell Research (2008)   
26 Roche v Roche [2010] 2IR 321. 
27 Ibid 338, per McGovern J, 351 per Murray CJ,   
28 Ibid 383 per Geoghegan J. 
29 W. Binchy, ‘Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution: Respecting the Dignity and Worth of Human Beings’, in J. 
Schweppe, The Unborn Child, Article 40.3.3 and Abortion in Ireland (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2008), p. 195. 
30 Roche v Roche [2010] 2IR, 347-348. 
31 Ibid  
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when this relationship existed that Article 40.3.3 was applicable.32 Thus any rights of the unborn under 
Article 40.3.3 were inextricably linked to those of the mother. This relationship was physical and only 
applied to a woman in the context of pregnancy and thus to an embryo upon implantation. 
Yet such an interpretation of the Constitution is at odds with a purposive interpretation of Article 
40.3.3. Such an interpretation does not view the eighth amendment as constitutionally prohibiting 
abortion, but prohibits abortion through affording the unborn the right to life and with that, the best 
interests of the unborn is a consideration.33 Until such time as Article 40.3.3 is repealed, this protection 
of the unborn may extend to keeping a clinically dead pregnant woman alive if it is in the best interests 
of the foetus.34 It is thus clear that the remit of Article 40.3.3 goes beyond abortion and interferes with 
other elements of reproductive care. This does not necessarily imply that it is intended to extend to 
embryos in vitro. 
However it is not just Article 40.3.3 that must be considered in the context of the embryo in vitro. The 
right of marital privacy as discussed in McGee v Attorney General,35 is constitutionally protected and 
Denham J thus considered Article 40.3.3 within the context of Article 41.1.2. A finding that embryos 
come under the definition of unborn would require state interference to ensure that all embryos are 
implanted.36 Not only would this outlaw certain contraceptive practices, but it would also require the 
implantation of all embryos created through IVF, irrespective of viability and irrespective of the wishes 
of the parents. In view of Article 41.1.2, Denham J considered that this was outside the competence 
of the State, as a decision on whether or not to have children, including through IVF, is a private matter 
for parents.37 Consideration should also be given to the judgment of Finlay CJ in AG v X who stated 
that that qualification in Art 41.1.2? ‘as far as practicable’ means that the Court has the discretion not 
to  ‘make orders which are futile, impractical or ineffective’.38 Any decision that would have rendered 
common contraceptive practices illegal would certainly be futile, impractical or ineffective. 
The courts were unequivocal that beyond the constitutional matter at hand, the issue as to the status 
of the embryo is a matter for the government to resolve. The difficulty of the task was acknowledged 
as arguments that an embryo is life will be countered with the importance of embryo research for 
medical purposes.39 However, while such matters require development of policy in a matter that is 
fraught with legal, ethical and moral complexity, Hardiman J noted that ‘the fact that difficulties are 
raised does not absolve the legislature from the obligation’.40 The learned judge stressed the need for 
legislation as ‘Ireland may become by default an unregulated environment for practices that may 
prove controversial or, at least, give rise to a need for regulation’.41 
                                                          
32 Ibid 370, per Denham J. 
33 See PP V HSE [2014] IEHC 622 
34 Ibid. See also Fiona de Londras, Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights: A Salutary Tale from Ireland, 22 Mich. J. 
Gender & L. 243 (2015). 
35 McGee v. Attorney General  [1974] I.R. 284. 
36 Roche v Roche [2010] 2IR 321, 372. 
37 Ibid. 
38 AG v X [1992] 1 IR 1.  
39 Ibid 393, per Geoghegan J. 
40 Ibid 383. 
41 Ibid. 
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It is thus clear that legislation on this matter is necessary to clarify the status of the embryo and ESCR. 
Despite its clear intention to leave decisions as to the status of the embryo with the legislature, there 
are a number of points worth noting. 
Fennelly J reflected in Roche that if they continue to abdicate their responsibility, the courts may be 
forced to consider the issue again. Although there is no constitutional provision explicitly referring to 
embryos, Fennelly and Geoghegan JJ hinted that an embryo could enjoy constitutional protection 
under some other article of the Constitution. This may perhaps come from one of the unenumerated 
rights under Article 40.3,42 but is as yet unexplored. However considering the importance of Article 
41.1.2 in this debate, it is unlikely that the embryo would have full constitutional protection and the 
legislature should be mindful that any attempts to give full protection to an embryo would be unlikely 
to withstand constitutional challenge.  
A determination of the status of the embryo is likely to be grounded on the notion of respect for the 
embryo with Hardiman, Geoghegan and Fennelly JJ stating that the embryo is entitled to respect. 
Hardiman J considered that this respect lies in its ability to become life43 and in the view of Geoghegan 
J that the State’s failure to indicate how this respect should be given ‘is undesirable and arguably 
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution’.44 Fennelly J supported this view that there is a constitutional 
obligation to provide respect for the embryo in law.45 McGuinness and Ui Chonnachtaigh argue that it 
would be unusual for a Constitution to give such strong protection to an embryo in utero and 
simultaneously give none to the embryo in vitro.46 However, it is likely that while the protection may 
differ, the respect the courts seems to afford to embryos in vitro and comments that the state is 
arguably failing in its constitutional duty to protect the embryo, would suggest that there is some, 
albeit unexploited, constitutional protection for the embryo in vitro.  
Embryo research in Europe 
While the protection of embryos in Ireland remains unsettled, there have been a number of 
developments in the European Union. The competences of the EU traditionally lie in creating an 
internal market and economic union,47 but the Commission has begun to take a more active role in 
health and technology since 2002 with the adoption of programmes on public health.48 The EU has 
also committed itself to becoming a bigger player in the world economy through increased investment 
in research49 and biotechnology50 with the aim of improving public health. As part of this commitment 
                                                          
42 I Clissmann, J Barrett ‘The Embryo in vitro after Roche v Roche: What Protection is Now Offered?’ (2012) 
18(1) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 13-19, 17. 
43 Roche v Roche [2010] 2IR 321, 382. 
44 Ibid 393. 
45 Ibid 395. 
46 S McGuinness, S Ui Chonnachtaigh ‘Implications of Recent Developments in Ireland for the Status of the 
Embryo’ (2011) 20 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 396–408, 405. 
47 Article 3 (ex Art 2). 
48 Decision No 1786/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 adopting a 
programme of Community action in the field of public health (2003-2008), Decision No 1350/2007/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 establishing a second programme of Community 
action in the field of health (2008-13) 
49 Communication on working together for growth and jobs - a new start for the Lisbon strategy COM (2005) 
24 final. 
50 Communication on promoting the competitive environment for industrial activities based on biotechnology 
within the community SEC (91) 629 final. 
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to research and health, there has been activity on biological materials, 51  clinical trials52  and the 
patenting of biotechnology.53 However it is economic integration, not moral integration, which is the 
purpose of the EU 54  and there has been no attempt to harmonise health research ethics, with 
individual Member States left to develop their own policies on ESCR.   
The emergence of biotechnology has blurred the distinction between regulating technology and 
regulating ethics. Introducing policies on biotechnology, in particular controversial technologies, can 
implicitly endorse a particular ethical viewpoint, creating a tension between the need to harmonise 
biotechnology to further economic integration, and the need to respect the constitutional traditions 
of Member States. Ethics and biotechnology are not mutually exclusive, and the ethical challenges 
posed by new technologies are at the forefront of any regulatory discussion. Introducing an EU-wide 
policy that permits ESCR, even if subject to the laws of the Member State, could imply an EU 
acceptance of the research and could suggest the emergence of a European consensus on this matter.  
Issues pertaining to the status of the embryo and embryo research are notoriously difficult to settle 
at a national level and become even more complicated at a supranational level where there are 
differing constitutional traditions and cultural values to consider. Nevertheless, policy that impacts on 
the embryo has been developed. 
Funding ESCR in Europe 
EU funding of scientific research is primarily channeled through programmes known as ‘Framework 
Programmes’ (FPs). FPs are the main financial tools through which the EU supports research and 
development activities, covering almost all scientific disciplines. FP6 (2003-2006), adopted in 2002, 
was the first FP in which it was agreed to fund ESCR, a policy continued under FP7 and Horizon2020. 
Despite the decision to fund the research in principle in 2002, a moratorium was agreed between the 
European Commission and the Council so as to give them time to put in place detailed provisions to 
implement this new policy.55 During these discussions, the Commission was at pains to point out that 
the development of a funding policy for ESCR was ‘not about establishing EU legislation on ethical 
questions’, but rather its focus was on fostering collaborations to promote research that benefits the 
                                                          
51 Directive 2004/23/EC on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, 
processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells. Regulation on advanced therapy 
medicinal products and amending Directive 2001/83/EC. 
52 Directive 2004/27/EC amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use. 
53 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions. 
54 M Facale, A Plomer ‘Fundamental disjunction in the EU legal order on human tissue, cells and advanced 
regenerative therapies’ (2009) 16 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 89-112, 94. 
55  Commission of the European Communities (2003) Proposal for a Council decision amending decision 
2002/834/EC on the specific programme for research, technological development and demonstration: 
‘Integrating and strengthening the European research area’ (2002–2006). Brussels, 9.7.2003, COM (2003) 390 
final 3. 
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citizens of the EU ’while respecting national rules and values’.56 The Commission thus committed itself 
to funding ESCR, leaving Member States free to consider the ethical issues.57  
However, due to the nature of the research, it was not possible to ignore the ethical considerations 
and, perhaps mindful of the debate within Member States, a number of rules were adopted. 
Collaborations were encouraged to avoid the duplication of research and the unnecessary destruction 
of embryos. Only spare embryos left over after IVF treatment prior to 27 June 2002 could be used to 
create an embryonic stem cell line58 and it had to be proven that other research methods, such as 
adult stem cell research, would not yield the desired results of the research.59 Importantly, research 
that is prohibited in a Member State will not be funded.60 Thus, irrespective of this agreed funding 
framework, funding will only be granted if ESCR is permitted in the Member State and the 
Commission’s policy seems to align itself somewhat with Article 18 of the Oviedo Convention. Member 
States are free to decide on the fundamental issue of whether to permit ESCR, but the creation of 
embryos for research purposes is not permitted. 
Instrumental in the drafting of the guidance for FP6 and FP7 was the European Group on Ethics (EGE), 
the body tasked with providing the Commission with ethical guidance for new technologies. Opinion 
15 considered the creation of embryos for research purposes to be ethically unacceptable when there 
are spare embryos available 61  and in 2007, on request from President Barroso, the EGE issued 
Recommendations on the ethical review of hESC FP7 research projects.62 Similar to the stance of the 
Commission, the EGE stressed that they were not looking at the ethics of ESCR, but rather the focus 
was on the implementation of a funding policy. 63  Thus, both the approach of the EGE and the 
Commission to ESCR has been similar: both turned their attention away from the ethical debate 
towards the implementation of a funding policy.  
Importantly, although not binding on Member States, this funding framework represents the first 
European statement from the Commission on what can be done with the human embryo. It could also 
represent some, albeit limited, consensus on ESCR within Europe. The guidelines only apply to projects 
in receipt of European funds, but they are nonetheless an ESCR policy, a policy agreed by all Member 
States which permits ESCR in certain circumstances. Interestingly it is also a policy that was supported 
by the Irish government, which stated that should ESCR be permitted, it must be conducted with 
                                                          
56 Commission, Commission report on embryonic stem cell research provides basis for discussion on ethics 
IP/03/506, Brussels, 7 April 2003. 
57 ‘Inter-institutional debate on stem cell research reveals extent of ethical split within Europe’ 25 April 2003 
<http://cordis.europa.eu/search/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.document&N_LANG=EN&N_RCN=20147&pid=34
&q=D947BD405B4FECE44933948AB2209F56&type=sim> [accessed 16 June 2012].  
58  Commission, Commission report on embryonic stem cell research provides basis for discussion on ethics 
IP/03/506, Brussels, 7 April 2003, 8. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid para 1.1. 
61 Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 
Opinion #15 (2000) Ethical Aspects of Human Stem Cell Research and Use, para 2.7. 
62 The European Group on Ethics in Science and New  Technologies to the European Commission 
Recommendations on the ethical review of  hESC FP7 research projects Opinion #27 (2007). 
63 Ibid 3. 
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proper regulation and safeguards in place.64 At the time, the government was awaiting the report of 
the CAHR and the status of the embryo had not been clarified by the Supreme Court, yet the Irish 
government approved these rules through a formal endorsement of the policy, and indirectly through 
the contribution of Irish taxes towards embryo research in Europe. EU funds cannot be spent on the 
derivation of the stem cell line and will therefore not fund the destruction of the embryo, but this 
policy is an acceptance of the research by both the Irish government and the EU. It also provides us 
with the first indication as to what the Irish government considers to be acceptable policy in the realm 
of ESCR.  
Achieving this consensus is significant considering the diverging views across Member States on this 
issue, and arguably this minimum level of consensus is all that can be achieved considering the 
differing legal, ethical and cultural differences across the EU.65 No further harmonisation on ESCR 
should be attempted as it is unlikely to be possible to achieve, nor desirable to attempt. A framework 
such as this, which provides a funding mechanism for the research but leaves Member States with the 
authority to permit or prohibit the research, is perhaps best in light of the differing approaches to 
ESCR across Member States, yet for Irish policy, it brings many questions and contradictions. Ireland 
is not only permitting, but funding ESCR in other Member States, yet has continued to prohibit any 
such activities on Irish soil. It is a policy that lacks ethical consistency and is without legal foundation. 
Patenting of ESCR in Europe 
Irish policy makers have been undeterred by any legal or ethical justifications to introduce embryonic 
stem cell policy. However, favourable patenting policies for ESCR could bring an economic return and 
provide an economic incentive to provide regulatory oversight for this research in Ireland.  
Biotechnological research is expensive and cannot be dependent upon public funding only. Favourable 
patenting policies that make it possible to obtain a return on investment can encourage private 
investment in the research as a patent gives the inventor exclusive rights to monopolise their 
invention for 20 years.66 It can stimulate medical research as it allows for compensation of research, 
and patients can benefit from the developments in diagnostics and therapeutics.67 The patent holder 
can sell their patent under a licence agreement, opt to exploit the invention, or simply do nothing with 
the patent, while still preventing others from using the patented product. The Nuffield Council notes 
that the securing of funding through the promise of a patent is likely to play a significant role ‘in 
shaping the dynamics of scientific research and technological innovation’.68 Thus if inventions arising 
out of ESCR can be patented, scientists based in Ireland may be able to attract private funding. 
                                                          
64 Seanad Debates 19 November 2003 Vol 174 No.14 col 1096. Smyth J (2006) EU to provide stem-cell research 
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65 S Halliday, 'A comparative approach to the regulation of human embryonic stem cell research in Europe', 
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(ed) ‘States and Stem Cells: the Policy and Economic Implications of State-Funded Stem Cell Research’ 
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An Observation on Modern Patent Law’ in P Drahos (ed) Death of Patents (Lawtext Publishing, London, 2005). 
67 Group of Advisors on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology Ethical Aspects of Patenting Involving 
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Due to the increasingly important role that biotechnology is playing in industries, the Biotechnology 
Directive was introduced to protect biotechnology inventions to ensure the continuing development 
of Community industries.69 The Commission sought to remove any barriers to the patenting of biotech 
inventions through this directive and its purpose was to harmonise this area of law to promote 
research and develop biotechnology.70 However, despite the perceived importance of biotechnology 
and the need for an EU directive that specifies that biotechnological inventions are patentable, due to 
pressure from the Green lobby, the European Parliament exercised its veto power71 and rejected the 
first draft of the Directive in 1995 for failing to contain a reference to morality.72 A new version 
proposed by the Commission later that year included general and specific exclusions on public 
morality and was eventually passed in 1998.73  
Importantly for ESCR, Article 6(2)(c) prohibits the patenting of ‘uses of human embryos for industrial 
or commercial purposes’, but once again embryos are not defined  and it is also not clear whether 
embryonic stem cell lines came under the definition. The uncertainty over the patenting of ESCR is in 
part due to ESCR being in its infancy when the Directive was drafted,74 but securing agreement would 
likely have been fateful to the Directive. Further guidance was necessary but the EGE was of the 
opinion that a decision on the patenting of ESCR inventions was closely linked to defining an embryo 
and both should be determined by national legislation in accordance with its own laws and values.75 
Thus further guidance or harmonisation on this issue was deemed to be unnecessary.76 Once again 
there was broad consensus, but disagreement with the detail. 
This perspective was challenged in the case of Brustle v Greenpeace77 where the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) was asked by the Federal Court of Justice of Germany to clarify the scope 
of Article 6(2)(c). The Court was asked to consider three specific questions: the definition of the 
embryo under the Directive; whether commercial exploitation for scientific research comes under the 
definition of ‘uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes’; and whether an 
invention that uses an embryo at any stage be precluded from patentability.78 
Concerning the first question, the Court noted that the lack of a definition coupled with a lack of 
reference to national laws implies that the term must have a uniform definition across the EU.79 For 
the Court, this conclusion was supported by the aims and objectives of the Directive80 which sought 
                                                          
69 European Parliament Resolution on Patents for Biotechnology Inventions (October 2005) OJ 272 E/440. 
70 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament [2002] ECR 574 para 27. 
71 Article 251 EC. See also RS Crespi ‘The Human Embryo and Patent Law: A Major Challenge Ahead’ [2006] 28 
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72 D Curley,A Sharples n 71. 
73 RS Crespi, n 71, 571. 
74 M Rowaldson ‘WARF/Stem cells (G2/06): the ordre public and morality exception and its impact on the 
patentability of human embryonic stem cells’ (2010) 32 European Intellectual Property Review 67-76, 67. 
75 Opinion on the European Group of Ethics on Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 
Ethical Aspects of Patenting Inventions Involving Human Stem Cells 7 May 2002 
76 Ibid. See also Final Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Developments 
and implications of patent law in the field of biotechnology and genetic engineering COM(2005) 312, para 2.2; 
University of Nottingham Stem Cell Patents: European Patent Law and Ethics (2006). 
77 [2011] ECR 1-9821. 
78 Ibid para 23. 
79 Ibid para 26.  
80 Ibid para 27. 
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to harmonise patent protection across the EU.81 While recognising that there were debates across 
Member States as to the status of the embryo, the Court was of the opinion that it was required to 
give a legal decision on the definition of the term ‘human embryo’ in the context of the Directive.82 In 
other words, the Court had to provide a uniform definition for the embryo that would bind all Member 
States when considering patent applications under the Biotechnology Directive. Significantly, the 
Court ruled that while the purpose of the Directive was to promote investment, the use of biological 
material must have regard for fundamental rights and in particular dignity, thus the term embryo must 
be given a broad definition.83 Therefore, under the Directive, the CJEU ruled that a human embryo is 
formed once an egg is fertilised,84  but declined to state whether an embryonic stem cell line is 
considered an embryo under the Directive. This is a decision for the national courts to make in light of 
scientific developments.85  
Regarding the second question, the Court ruled that the use of embryos for scientific purposes is 
defined as  ‘the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes’86 and that only uses ‘for 
therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it being 
patentable’ can be patented.87 Finally and most importantly for ESCR, the Court stated that if an 
embryo is destroyed in the making of the invention, it is unpatentable, irrespective of how far removed 
the destruction of the embryo was from the patent application.88 The Court considered that the 
commericalisation of an invention that destroyed an embryo in its making would be an affront to 
dignity. 
The European Patent Office (EPO) had previously decided in the Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation (WARF) case that if an embryo was destroyed in the making of an invention, it was 
unpatentable.89 However this decision is surprising, as it had previously been established policy that 
due to the presumption of patentability, exceptions to this general principle of patentability ought to 
be interpreted narrowly.90  
Prior to the Brustle decision some limited consensus perhaps had emerged in Europe: that is, that the 
embryo was deserving of protection and that the definition of an embryo was for individual countries 
to decide. There was a push to limit research to spare embryos left over after IVF, but this was not 
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successful. Thus the judgment in Brustle is somewhat surprising. Despite the clear lack of consensus 
across Europe and the lack of a definition in the Directive, the Court held that an embryo is formed at 
fertilisation. Although its decision is confined to commercialisation, the decision is a worrying 
restrictive step, particularly in light of the differing legislative schemes of Member States.91  
Second, the Court based its reasoning on the protection of dignity. In other words, to ensure respect 
for human dignity, a fertilised egg must be considered an embryo. Due to the wide level of protection 
needed, an embryo that is destroyed at any stage in the making of an invention cannot be patented; 
according to the CJEU, to commercialise ESCR would be contrary to human dignity. Consensus on 
these issues, particularly on the protection of embryos, has been notoriously difficult to achieve, and 
it is questionable whether more than the literal meaning should have been inferred from the Directive. 
The expansive nature of this decision is all the more surprising considering that the Directive was 
unlikely to have been drafted with ESCR in mind and it is unclear whether the drafters considered it. 
It is a rather wide interpretation of a provision that was to be narrowly interpreted, requiring no moral 
decision to be made.92  If a moral decision is to be made on the destruction of the embryo, it is by the 
Member States under Article 6(1). A decision that hESCs do not fall under the exclusions would have 
not precluded Member States from prohibiting the invention under Article 6(1) in line with its own 
legal and ethical framework, that is reflective of its own cultural values. 
This decision has been somewhat limited by International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General 
of Patents.93 The CJEU held that to constitute a human embryo, the entity must have the capacity to 
develop into an embryo and this is a matter for the national courts to decide.94 However, the crux of 
the Brustle decision, that the destruction of an embryo at any point in the making of the invention 
renders it unpatentable, remains in place.  
Council of Europe 
There have also been some developments within the Council of Europe on this matter. Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects the right to life. Although the scope of that 
right is undefined, the European Convention on Human Rights has consistently left it within the margin 
of appreciation for Member States to determine whether that should apply to the foetus as there is 
no consensus on a scientific or legal definition of the beginning of life.95 Evans v United Kingdom 
concerned the disposition of frozen embryos and the Court ruled unanimously that the issue as to the 
right to life comes within the margin of appreciation of Member States.96 The Court also noted: 
‘Where, however, there is no consensus within the Member States of the Council of Europe, 
either as to the relative importance of the of the interest at stake or as to the best means of 
protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin 
will be wider.’97 
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The Convention for Human Rights and Biomedicine (the Oviedo Convention) opened for signature in 
April 1997 and came into force in December 1999. It is, to date, the only binding international 
instrument concerning bioethics, biomedicine and human rights. The Convention deals with, amongst 
other things, patient rights, genetic testing and scientific research. It also permits, under Article 18, 
research on embryos in vitro, provided there is adequate protection of the embryo, but prohibits the 
creation of embryo for research purposes. At best it is a basic framework on biomedicine from which 
States are required to implement and enact legislation on the subject matter. It could also be 
considered a consensus statement on some of these issues. However a deeper examination reveals 
consensus as to Article 18 to be superficial.  
Although the Convention was developed prior to the CAHR, discussions since then have focused on 
the embryo that may have influence. First the term ‘human embryo’ is not defined in the Convention 
and the Working Party on the Protection of the Human Embryo and Foetus agreed that while there is 
broad agreement across Europe on the need to protect the embryo in vitro, consensus on the status 
of the embryo remains elusive. 98  This lack of definition is unsurprising when one considers the 
diversity of approach in Europe. In Spain the term only applies 14 days after fertilisation, while in 
Germany it applies from the moment of fertilisation.99  
Second, with the exception of creating embryos for research purposes, it leaves States free to decide 
whether to permit embryo research, provided there is adequate protection in place. Thus ESCR is not 
forced upon Member States and the restrictions are limited to the sources of embryos and ensuring 
there are safeguards to protect the embryo. It echoes the jurisprudence of the ECtHR that largely 
leaves these issues within the margin of appreciation of Member States. Yet Article 18 has faced 
criticism from Germany which argue that it is too liberal and contravenes its laws on embryo 
protection and the UK which has failed to ratify the Convention as it permits the creation of embryos 
for research. 100  Thus while there is an agreement in place pertaining to embryos in vitro any 
perception of consensus is illusory. 
2005-2017: Legislative malaise in Ireland 
Within Europe during this period, a tentative consensus emerged: there is recognition that ESCR 
should occur, but no extra embryos should be created for this purpose. Further, the research should 
only be conducted when  methods such as adult stem cell or IPSC research cannot yield the same 
results. Although IPSC research is not without its ethical concerns, the research itself is seen as 
ethically uncontroversial as adult stem cell research and thus encouraged as an alternative to ESCR. 
On the face of it Brustle does seem out of step with matters of letting Member States decide, but 
concerns were with commercialisation of the research only and not the research itself. However such 
consensus is reflective of a restrictive attitude to ESCR and no further agreement on this matter is 
likely. 
In Ireland clarification on the constitutional status of the embryo had in fact little impact. The Supreme 
Court has definitively stated that an embryo does not fall within the protection of Article 40.3.3 and 
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while declined to pronounce on its status, suggested that it is worthy of respect. In the face of 
legislative reluctance, both University College Cork (UCD) and Trinity College Dublin (TCD) developed 
guidelines permitting ESCR. 101  Although both policies broadly reflected the recommendations 
contained in the ICB report, it meant that there was no national conversation on this research and 
national oversight was lacking. However, despite no legal impediment to ESCR in Ireland, scientists in 
Ireland continued to be prevented from developing ESCR technology. In the aftermath of the Roche 
decision, the biggest funders of science in Ireland, Science Foundation Ireland and the Health Research 
Board, announced that on instruction from the Department of Health, no ESCR would be funded as 
the Department was preparing regulations on assisted reproduction. This moratorium on funding 
extended to EU funds and, in part due to the complexity of this therapy, large-scale investment from 
biotechnology companies has been slow to materialise.102 Thus a de facto ban remained in place. This 
ban has had no impact on IPSC research in Ireland. While researchers cannot  use an embryonic control, 
IPSC research is ongoing.  
Brustle also removed a clear financial incentive for biotechnology companies to invest in the research 
and may have dampened any government enthusiasm to either fund the research or engage in a 
debate on the status of the embryo. Ireland’s Innovation 2020 strategy is seeking in increase Ireland’s 
scientific capacity and infrastructure. Ireland has a growing reputation for adult stem cell research, 
attracting both national and international funding, and the licensing of therapies from this research 
has begun. 103  The development and growth of ESCR in Ireland could complement this growing 
reputation, but the Innovation 2020 strategy puts a strong focus on securing intellectual property (IP) 
rights from publically funded research to support innovation.104 ESCR would therefore fall outside of 
this strategy. This lack of IP protection came under scrutiny during the discussions of Horizon 2020 
when the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament voted against funding ESCR on the 
grounds that it cannot be patented. 105  The aim of Horizon 2020 is to stimulate European 
competitiveness and the inability to secure intellectual property rights on the research precludes ESCR 
from contributing to Europe’s competiveness. Ultimately it was decided to fund ESCR as part of 
Horizon2020, but Brustle may impact future policy initiatives and may have had an impact in Ireland.  
Finally, by failing to legislate for the embryo for twelve years, there was an implicit decision to leave 
it with no protection in law. In stark contrast to the full legal status of the embryo in vivo, successive 
Irish governments have offered the embryo in vitro no protection. The status of the embryo depends 
on its environment alone, a policy that is without a strong moral foundation and has been discussed, 
potentially contrary to the Constitution. Environment can increase the potential of an embryo to 
develop into a human being, but it ignores the inherent characteristics of the embryo that contribute 
to this potentiality. Some of these characteristics (both genetic and moral) can have significant bearing 
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on the status of the embryo that exist independently of its environment. No decision on the status of 
the embryo will be free of ethical criticism. Indeed it may not be the inherent characteristics of the 
embryo, but rather that its representation as the earliest forms of life that is deemed to be morally 
significant. However legislation on this matter to ensure that the embryo is respected in law, to ensure 
that researchers can access public funding for ESCR and not leave ESCR solely dictated by a policy on 
public funds and it is also necessary to have a national dialogue on such matters and not leave them 
to the privy of local research institutions. 
General Scheme of the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017 
In October 2017, the General Scheme of the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017 was published 
and it seeks to regulate assisted reproduction and associated research. Specifically, it makes provisions 
for gamete and embryo donation for use in assisted human reproduction treatment and research; 
surrogacy; posthumous assisted reproduction; pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and sex selection; 
ESCR and IPSC research; and to introduce an independent regulatory authority for AHR.  
The Bill is a welcomed development. Years of legislative inaction has prevented embryo research and 
ESCR from occurring in Ireland. However the Bill as it stands is restrictive in nature, leaves the 
proposed Regulatory Authority with very limited powers to consider new and emerging developments 
in this area and, rather unexpectedly, will have an unwarranted and negative impact on IPSC research 
in Ireland. This Bill as it stands views ESCR as a by-product of assisted reproduction: research is only 
permitted on those embryos left over after assisted reproduction and fails to consider the wider 
scientific and ethical justifications for permitting ESCR as an activity in and of itself.1. Definition of an 
embryo 
The first indication of the restrictive nature of the Bill is in Head 2 whereby a human embryo is defined 
as an entity that is ‘formed by the fertilisation of a human egg by a human sperm’.106 Such a definition 
is similar to that of the CJEU in Brustle, although Irish policy makers were under no obligation to 
embrace such a definition. Brustle pertains to patenting cases only and has no application to the 
definition of an embryo in the context of research. By adopting such a definition, Irish policy makers 
have ignored the problems that come with overly prescriptive definitions that are based on 
fertilisation encountered in other jurisdictions. In the UK, the definition of an embryo under the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990 was originally defined in the context of 
fertilisation but was later changed to include ‘any other process by which the embryo was created 
began outside the human body.107 Such a change came about as a result of a challenge as to whether 
the HFE Act 1990 encompassed embryos created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT),108 and 
a recommendation that all human embryos, regardless of the mode of creation of the embryo, should 
fall within the regulations set down by the HFE Act 1990.109  
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Embryos created through SCNT are cloned embryos and it is often referred to as ‘therapeutic cloning’ 
as they are cloned for research purposes and not reproduction.110 A stem cell line created through 
such as process will  be genetically identical to its recipient and likely to be of great benefit in the field 
of regenerative medicine. Due to the potential benefit of embryos created through SCNT, the CAHR 
recommended that their use should be permitted for research purposes.111 The definition of the 
embryo as it stands not only restricts the possible sources of a stem cell line, but also leaves the Bill 
scientifically outdated before it has even become law. 
Head 59 and 60 provide an explicit prohibition of the use of embryos through SCNT. Head 59 prevents 
the creation of embryos for research purposes (and that includes through SCNT) as the availability of 
spare embryos left over after IVF provides a ready source of embryos and no justification for creation 
thus exists. Head 60 prohibits the cloning of embryos and a discussion of SCNT is incorporated into 
that of reproductive cloning, with no distinction made between reproductive and therapeutic cloning.  
The prohibition of SCNT is thus problematic on two grounds. First the ethical considerations involved 
in reproductive cloning are distinct from therapeutic cloning.112 Reproductive cloning is generally 
perceived to be an affront to human dignity and a threat to human identity. However the purpose of 
therapeutic cloning is to create a cell line for the treatment of a particular disease or use in a therapy. 
This brings us to the second issue and that is that there are clear scientific justifications for the creation 
of embryos for this purpose, arguments the Bill fails to consider or address. 2. Permitted research 
The value of the Bill is it clarifies the permitted grounds for ESCR: research that can lead to advances 
in knowledge, treatments or other procedures relating to assisted human reproduction, or the 
knowledge or treatment of serious diseases or other serious medical conditions is permitted under 
this Bill.113 This is almost identical to the funding policies under Horizon 2020 and in compliance with 
the Oviedo Convention. Importantly for researchers in Ireland, such clarification will enable them to 
access public funding of research. Importation of stem cell lines is also permitted, provided they only 
come from spare embryos. This will enable scientists in Ireland to access cell lines from bodies such as 
the European Human Embryonic Stem Cell Registry, thereby helping to avoid unnecessary creation of 
embryonic stem cell lines, as required under Horizon2020 guidelines. 
The Supreme Court in Roche made it clear that the embryo is deserving of respect and consideration 
must be given as to whether this Bill meets that requirement. The linking of respect with what can be 
done with the embryo originated in the Warnock Report and has formed the basis of the regulation 
of IVF and ESCR in the UK and around the world.114 Questions have been asked around whether it is 
ethically consistent to permit embryos to be used for research while maintaining that they have special 
respect.115 The answer likely lies in the  status afforded to the embryo. If one accepts that the embryo 
has an intermediate interpretation somewhere between being a clump of cells and having full moral 
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status, then some limited form of research is permitted.116 By restricting the use of embryos for 
research to only the most serious of diseases and having clear oversight of the research, the Bill does 
satisfy that requirement. The Bill also prohibits the creation of embryos as being currently 
unwarranted and unjustified due to the availability of embryos left over after IVF. Restricting the 
creation of embryos for research purposes is thus currently justified on grounds of respecting the 
embryo provided this supply of embryos remains, although embryos created through SCNT should be 
an exception to this rule for reasons outlined above. 
Head 63 prohibits the development of an embryo beyond day 14 and justifies this on the basis that it 
‘is a widely established cut-off point because it is the stage at which the primitive streak develops’. 
However, this stance ignores recent scientific developments in this field in which it may now be 
possible to develop an embryo beyond day 14.117 It is acknowledged that very little is known about 
the developmental process of the human embryo from day 14 and that research on these embryos 
make offer useful insight into congenital defects and improve IVF practices. 118  In light of these 
developments, debates on the extension of this rule have begun elsewhere, but no opportunity for 
such a debate has been given in this Bill. Once again we may soon see provisions in this Bill quickly 
becoming outdated. 
3. IPSC Research 
Arguably the greatest problem with the Bill lies in its restriction of IPSC research as lacking in any legal, 
ethical or scientific justification and being out of step with international best practice. Head 62(3)(c) 
states that embryo, ESCR and IPSC research is only permitted where the aims of the research cannot 
be achieved through alternative forms of research. Head 63(1) puts the same regulatory requirements 
on IPSC research as ESCR. Thus, researchers who are currently conducting IPSC research in Ireland will 
now be expected to make an application to the proposed Regulatory Authority to conduct ISPC 
research, and it must be proven that the research cannot be done by any other means that does not 
require the use of IPSC research. The justification for introducing such a policy is stated in the 
Explanatory Notes as being that while ‘their source (i.e. adult somatic cells) is not controversial, the 
potential uses to which they can be put are similar to hESCs’. 
As IPSC research is still relatively in its infancy, the development of ESCR in tandem with IPSC research 
is encouraged. IPSC research is thus not free from any claims of moral complicity. The technology 
emerged out of ESCR and for now, the technology is very much linked to ESCR and continues to 
develop within this context.119 However this proposed policy does not make much sense from an 
ethical standpoint. The purpose of IPSC and ESCR is uncontroversial: it is hoped that it will lead to 
treatment and cures for the most serious degenerative diseases. It is the source of the cells that goes 
to the heart of the problem: in the development of ESCR an embryo will be destroyed. It is for this 
reason that limits are put on the source of cells and parameters of the research. IPSC research, 
although inadvertently supporting the development of ESCR, is free from the ethical considerations 
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that we see with ESCR and free from the ethical considerations that requires the additional oversight 
for ESCR that is explicitly stated in this Bill. The source of IPSC research is as ethically unproblematic 
as adult stem cell research and the aims of IPSC research are laudable. It is for this reason that the 
International Society for Stem Cell Research has stated that IPSC research does not require the same 
specialised review as ESCR.120 Funding requirements under Horizon2020 similarly do not contain any 
such requirements for IPSC research. Requiring this extra layer of regulatory approval for IPSC research 
has no ethical or legal justification and is out of step with international best practice. 
4. The Regulatory Authority 
Finally, a fundamental problem with this Bill and linked to each of the points above is that it is overly 
prescribed and gives insufficient power to the proposed Regulatory Authority to regulate these new 
and emerging technologies. First, despite the clear scientific justification for embryos created through 
SCNT, it restricts its use and closely links it to reproductive cloning. Second, it restricts the creation of 
embryos beyond day 14. Third, although a consideration of the ethical and scientific arguments for 
mitochondrial donation are beyond the scope of this article,121 both the use of these techniques and 
research into these techniques are prohibited. This ban is partly justified on the basis of safety 
concerns and lack of knowledge of the long term impact of such techniques. While such concerns 
could justify restricting the use of the techniques in humans, it is no basis for a prohibition on research. 
Appeals to safety for the purposes of research are unwarranted as it is through further research that 
concerns regarding the safety and long term impact of a new therapy can be resolved.  
These restrictions on research are unwarranted and may force patients in Ireland to go abroad for 
eventual therapies that use such embryos. It also reveals a real lack of confidence in the proposed 
Regulatory Authority and its associated committees. Under the Bill, approval from a Scientific and 
Ethics Committee of the Authority will be required before any research can take place. Provided they 
are appropriately staffed, such committees will be better placed to consider the scientific justifications, 
safety concerns and the ethical considerations of embryo research than what has been considered in 
the Bill. Permitting research on embryos beyond day 14 may ‘lead to advances in knowledge, 
treatments or other procedures relating to assisted human reproduction’ that cannot be carried out 
on other embryos. Permitting the creation of embryos through SCNT and mitochondrial research may 
lead to treatments that cannot come from other sources of embryos.  The Bill should be amended to 
reflect these advances in science, but also acknowledge that the Scientific and Ethics Committee are 
best placed to consider these issues. Additionally, under Head 63, such licences will only be approved 
after approval from a research ethics committee, thus offering and additional layer of approval. The 
explanatory notes under Head 70 states that the Regulatory Authority can outline the criteria 
necessary for the granting of a licence ‘as this is likely to be a dynamic process as technology and 
medical standards change’, but the Bill is so restrictive that the Authority will be unable to consider 
these current, new, and emerging technologies. 
                                                          
120 International Association for Stem Cell Research, Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and Clinical Translation 
(2016), para 2.1. 
121 See A Wrigley, S Wilkinson, J Appleby, ‘Mitochondrial replacement: ethics and identity’ (2015) 29(9) 
Bioethics 631-638. J Appleby, ‘The ethical challenges of the clinical introduction of mitochondrial replacement 
technique (2015) 18(4) Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 501-514. A Newson, S Wilkinson, ‘Ethical and 
legal issues in mitochondrial transfer’ (2016) 8 EMBO Molecular Medicine 589-591. 
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Conclusion 
Through the publication of this Bill, Ireland continues to belatedly follow developments elsewhere and 
refuses to lead on any of these issues. Irish policy makers have also failed to take advantage of the 
wide ranging debate on many of these issues in other jurisdictions. There are sound scientific 
justifications for permitting the creation of embryos through SCNT and research on mitochondrial 
transfer. The requirement of specialised review for IPSC research is not only out of step with 
international best practise, but defies logic.  
In the 12 intervening years since the publication of the CAHR Report, while successive Irish 
governments have failed to introduce legislation, the Irish courts and the CJEU have been forced to 
consider some of the issues that go to the heart of embryo research. Almost all countries have 
regulations that reflect the viewpoint that an embryo has some moral significance.122 The General 
Scheme of the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017 is a welcomed and long overdue development 
enabling Irish society to consider the complex moral, ethical and legal issues of ESCR. It will bring much 
needed certainty and the conditions under which embryo and ESCR is permitted are now clear. 
However it is unduly restrictive in nature, brings new and unnecessary regulation to IPSC research, 
and perhaps reflects a particular conservative political agenda for ESCR and embryo research, rather 
than being based on any concern for regenerative research in Ireland. Already the Bill is out of date 
on some matters and likely soon fall behind international best practice in other areas, necessitating 
legislative reform should this Bill become law. During the coming months, Irish policy makers must 
consider these issues and consider the scientific and ethical justification for permitting other forms of 
ESCR and embryo research. Finally, policy makers must place greater trust in the proposed Regulatory 
Authority and acknowledge that it will be better placed to oversee this rapidly developing technology.  
 
                                                          
122 S Holm ‘Time to reconsider stem cell ethics—the importance of induced pluripotent cells’ (2008) 34(2) J 
Med Ethics 63-64, 63. 
